The defendants' own conduct and admissions defeat their own cases. Waiver of forfeiture, promissory estoppel, Street v Mountford, and the unaccounted double payment.
Each of the arguments below is grounded in binding authority. In each case, the evidence comes from the defendants' own conduct, their own pleadings, or objective documentary records. These are not speculative claims. They are legal conclusions that follow inevitably from facts the defendants themselves have admitted or created.
Accepting rent or acknowledging the tenancy after knowledge of a breach constitutes waiver of the right to forfeit. The election is irrevocable once made.
Chelsea Harbour sent emails addressed "Dear Tenant" on 10 or more occasions after the alleged forfeiture date, between January and April 2024. Each email treated Michael as a current tenant with ongoing obligations. A landlord who has forfeited a lease does not write to the former tenant as "Dear Tenant". The correspondence is evidence of election to affirm the lease.
The landlord had full knowledge of the alleged breach before the purported forfeiture. Matthews v Smallwood requires only that the landlord knew of the breach at the time of the act said to constitute waiver. The "Dear Tenant" emails were sent after that knowledge crystallised. Each email is a separate act of waiver.
The premises were padlocked. Silvia confirmed this by WhatsApp message. Ross claimed the locks were merely changed. This is false. Padlocking premises is not a peaceable re-entry. It is a forcible exclusion. The distinction matters because forcible re-entry without a court order is unlawful under the Criminal Law Act 1977 s.6 and because it evidences the landlord's intent to exclude by force, not by lawful process.
Once a landlord elects to treat the lease as continuing (by any unequivocal act such as demanding rent, addressing the tenant as tenant, or treating the property as let), the right to forfeit for that breach is permanently lost. Chelsea Harbour did not merely make one ambiguous communication. They made 10 or more unequivocal ones. The forfeiture is void as a matter of law.
Where a party makes a clear and unequivocal promise that strict legal rights will not be enforced, and the other party relies on that promise, the promisor cannot resile from it without giving reasonable notice.
LRP's own Defence at paragraph 10.4 admits that a mid-month payment arrangement was in place. This is not a disputed fact. The defendant's own pleading confirms it. Michael paid mid-month because that was the agreed arrangement.
Michael structured his finances around the mid-month payment date. He relied on the representation that mid-month payment was acceptable. This reliance was reasonable because the arrangement was explicitly agreed and consistently honoured over the relevant period.
LRP calculated "arrears" against the original contractual payment date, not the agreed mid-month date. Under the High Trees principle, they could not do this without first giving reasonable notice that they intended to revert to the original terms. No such notice was given. The arrears that supposedly triggered forfeiture did not exist under the arrangement both parties were operating under.
LRP did not give any notice that they intended to enforce the original contractual payment date. They simply calculated arrears against it and used those fictitious arrears to justify forfeiture. A party bound by promissory estoppel must give reasonable notice before reverting to strict legal rights. LRP gave none.
If an occupier has exclusive possession of premises for a term at a rent, the arrangement is a tenancy regardless of any label the parties attach to it. Substance prevails over form.
Recorder Cohen KC stated that "there are other reasons that determine a lease other than exclusive possession". This is a misstatement of the law. The House of Lords in Street v Mountford held that exclusive possession for a term at a rent is the defining characteristic of a tenancy. Lord Templeman's speech is unequivocal. A court cannot add additional requirements that the House of Lords expressly rejected.
LRP's Defence admits the arrangement that was in place. Michael had exclusive possession of the premises. He occupied for a term. He paid rent (even if on a mid-month schedule). All three elements of the Street v Mountford test are satisfied on the defendant's own case. Their own pleading defeats their own argument.
If the arrangement is a tenancy (which it is, per Street v Mountford), then the statutory protections against forfeiture in s.146 of the Law of Property Act 1925 apply. Section 146 requires that the landlord serve a notice specifying the breach, requiring remedy, and requiring compensation. No s.146 notice was served. The forfeiture is therefore unlawful.
Even if the parties described the arrangement as a licence, that label cannot convert a tenancy into something else. Street v Mountford exists precisely to prevent landlords from avoiding tenant protections by clever labelling. The substance of the arrangement determines its legal character, not the words used to describe it.
Where money is paid by mistake or without legal basis, the recipient is unjustly enriched and must make restitution. A payment made and not credited is a payment that must be accounted for.
On 14 February 2022, two separate payments of 2,286 pounds were made to LRP. Both payments are evidenced in bank records. This is a total of 4,572 pounds paid on a single day.
Only one of the two payments was credited to Michael's account with LRP. The second payment of 2,286 pounds was never acknowledged, never credited, and never disclosed. It disappeared.
The total amount unaccounted for is 4,572 pounds. This is not a rounding error or a timing difference. It is a complete payment that LRP received, retained, and never accounted for. If the arrears calculation that triggered forfeiture had credited this payment, the arrears would have been substantially reduced or eliminated.
The bank records showing both payments are preserved as Exhibit LRP-FIN-001. The evidence is documentary and objective. It does not depend on testimony or recollection. The payments were made. Only one was credited. LRP must account for the missing payment.
In the Chelsea Harbour case, the landlord continued to treat Michael as a tenant after the alleged forfeiture. Under Matthews v Smallwood, that conduct constitutes an irrevocable election to affirm the lease. The forfeiture is void.
In the LRP case, three independent arguments converge on the same conclusion. The mid-month payment arrangement creates a promissory estoppel that eliminates the arrears relied upon to justify forfeiture. The Street v Mountford test confirms the arrangement was a tenancy, which means s.146 notice was required and none was given. The double payment of 4,572 pounds was never credited, further undermining the arrears calculation.
Each argument is sufficient on its own. Together, they are overwhelming. The defendants' own admissions and conduct are the evidence. The authorities are binding. The forfeiture in both cases was unlawful.
I believe that the facts stated on this website are true. I understand that proceedings for contempt of court may be brought against anyone who makes, or causes to be made, a false statement in a document verified by a statement of truth without an honest belief in its truth.
Michael Darius Eastwood
Litigant in Person
ADHD + ASD (Equality Act 2010 s.6) | HMCTS RA Ref: 67862925
London, United Kingdom