Argument Map

10 orders made during the Mental Health Crisis Moratorium (28 Dec 2024 to 16 Apr 2025) are void ab initio under Regulation 7(12) DSRR 2020. Each order is void not merely because of when it was made but because of what it contains and what it does. The DDJ Wood order (6 January 2025, MHCM Day 9) fraudulently inserted costs "forthwith GBP 22,528" (enforcement), an unless strike-out (conditional enforcement), and a retrospective extension validating the late Defence. The Master Kaye costs stay (6 February 2025, MHCM Day 40) conditioned the proceedings on payment of void costs (enforcement of debt). Every order that depends on or follows from the 6 February costs stay is also void as a derivative nullity. The LCRO (27 February 2025, MHCM Day 61) restricts the debtor's access to the court (enforcement). The TWM certifications are enforcement acts. The statutory prohibition is mandatory and admits no discretion.

Orders founded on void MHCM orders are themselves void. The DDJ Wood order (Day 9) validated a late Defence; Cohen's summary judgment was founded on that Defence. The entire chain collapses.

Transfer from High Court to County Court on 13 Aug 2024 was made before service was effected (court email confirming service 28 Aug 2024). A court cannot transfer proceedings over which it has not yet acquired jurisdiction. The court itself acknowledged the defect by issuing a second transfer order (Deputy Master Dovar, 3 Sep 2024) and resealing the claim under CPR 17.1(1). If the first transfer was valid, no second transfer would have been necessary. The second transfer is a derivative nullity founded on the void first transfer. The Applicant filed a set-aside application against the first transfer which was never determined. Master Clark also split the single claimant into two separate parties, enabling DDJ Wood to strike out the second claimant through a void sealed order (MHCM Day 9).

Two sealed orders contain terms not pronounced at any hearing. DDJ Wood (06.01.2025, BL-2024-001166 (former County Court ref L10CL352), MHCM Day 9): costs 'reserved' at hearing sealed as 'forthwith 22,528' with strike-out of Mastermind Group Ltd as Second Claimant added (only possible because Master Clark's void transfer had split the single claimant into two parties). DM Glover (18.09.2024, BL-2024-001089): sealed order contains unpronounced directions restricting evidence, interim stay of ALL applications (no application made), bundle ban, and forced name change/claim split under threat of strike-out. 3 reasonable adjustment requests denied at the hearing. Undisclosed material used. Glover order is VOID on 4 independent grounds: (1) CPR 40.12 fabricated terms; (2) CPR 23.1 no application; (3) EA 2010 s.20 RA failure; (4) natural justice breach (Ridge v Baldwin [1964] AC 40). Reclassified from VOIDABLE to VOID 24.03.2026.

The Chancery Division LCRO of 27 Feb 2025, imposed by Master Kaye on BL-2024-001089 alone, was made on Day 61 of the MHCM. It was imposed by the same judge the Claimant had complained about 7 days earlier. It is void ab initio under Reg 7(12) as it constitutes enforcement action during the moratorium. The proceedings were undefended (no defence filed for 540+ days). Any further Chancery Division filing risks escalation to a General Civil Restraint Order (GCRO).

The Chancery Division LCRO on BL-2024-001089 was imposed by Master Kaye 7 days after a formal complaint against her. The same judge who was the subject of the complaint imposed the order on undefended proceedings (no defence filed for 540+ days). The ruling at para 41 expressly cites the complaint as evidence of 'persistence.' A fair-minded observer would conclude there was a real possibility of bias. CROs disproportionately target litigants in person. Any further Chancery Division filing risks a GCRO.

The cluster of 27 Feb 2025 orders was made ex parte without notice or opportunity to be heard. No CPR 3.3(5)(b) notification. No CPR 3.11 warning before CRO. Violates Lord Leggatt's Rule One (Potanina).

No lesser sanctions considered before imposing a 2-year Chancery Division LCRO on BL-2024-001089 alone. Imposed by the same judge the Claimant had complained about 7 days earlier, on undefended proceedings (no defence filed for 540+ days). No costs warning, no extended CRO. The nuclear option applied without proportionality analysis. TWM count arguably incorrect (N460 refused a non-existent application). Any further Chancery Division filing risks escalation to a GCRO.

R1 (Chelsea Harbour) 540+ days in default. No Defence filed. N227 request and N244 application both undetermined. R2/R3 (LRP/Vista) Defence filed 27 days late in a court without jurisdiction (the County Court, following the void transfer of BL-2024-001166), without CPR 3.9 relief or Denton analysis. The court granted substantive relief to defaulting defendants without first determining the anterior Part 12 / Part 23 issue.

Recorder Cohen granted summary judgment on 19 Aug 2025 on a Defence validated by a void DDJ Wood order (MacFoy cascade). The Defence itself contains sworn admissions conceding liability. Three independent Flannery breaches: (1) Cohen asserted "there are other reasons besides exclusive possession that determine a licence from a lease" but never identified what those reasons are. Under Street v Mountford [1985] AC 809 at 826G (Lord Templeman): "If the agreement satisfied all the requirements of a tenancy, then the agreement produced a tenancy and the parties cannot alter the effect of the agreement by insisting that they only created a licence." Exclusive possession + term + rent = tenancy as a matter of law. Cohen's unidentified "other reasons" cannot displace this. (2) Cohen described harassment as "very complicated" but the statutory test is straightforward. Protection from Harassment Act 1997 s.1(1): "A person must not pursue a course of conduct which amounts to harassment of another." Section 7(3): "A 'course of conduct' must involve conduct on at least two occasions." The facts are admitted: Michael gave a police warning on 17 February 2023 (Defence para 10.7.3). The defendants then locked him out on at least two further occasions (27 April and 20 May 2023, Defence para 10.11). That is a course of conduct after actual knowledge. The s.7(3) threshold is plainly met from the Defence alone. Treating this as "complicated" to deny relief is itself a Flannery breach. (3) Cohen admitted insufficient time to read the applicant's evidence and adopted counsel's draft order without modification. Flannery v Halifax [2000] 1 WLR 377 requires the judge to identify the issues vital to the conclusion and explain why they were resolved as they were.

Systematic discrimination arising from disability (s.15), failure to make reasonable adjustments (s.20), discrimination in provision of services (s.29), and breach of Public Sector Equality Duty (s.149) across all proceedings.

12 reasonable adjustment requests across all courts; 0 granted. 100% refusal rate. No evidence of any PD 1A consideration at any hearing. Rolls Building disability framework conceived around physical access only; neurodivergent conditions invisible.

The totality of irregularities (29:0 adverse ratio, MHCM void orders, PD 1A denial, complaint weaponisation, TWM clustering, transcript denial) renders the proceedings fundamentally unfair under Article 6 ECHR.

HHJ Dight CBE (the judge in Lees v Kaye who understood MHCM law) was scheduled but replaced at the last minute by Recorder Cohen KC, who then got the MHCM analysis wrong. No explanation for the swap. SAR filed.

Cohen's N460 refuses permission to appeal. Michael stated at the hearing he was NOT applying for PTA. Cohen imposed a TWM on an application that was never made. The N460 also invented an application to refuse. Wasif/Grace standard violated on multi-limb applications.

Defendants' counsel (Ciara Fairley) had Recorder Cohen's private judicial email before Michael did. Cohen adopted counsel's draft order, refused all LiP corrections, and told the LiP it was 'not appropriate' to correspond with the judge. Article 6 breach.

Cohen stated there were 'other reasons besides exclusive possession' for granting summary judgment but never identified them. A judge who fails to give adequate reasons commits a Flannery breach.

Cohen refused all 7 CPR 40.12 correction requests without engaging with them individually. The sealed order contains 'extemporary' (a non-word) and other errors. The order was sealed with uncorrected mistakes.

The 06.02.2025 hearing was listed as 'A v B' on the public cause list without any CPR 39.2 order authorising anonymity. No reason given. No application made. Open justice is a constitutional principle. This unexplained departure requires explanation.

In neither BL-2024-001089 nor BL-2024-001166 was disclosure ever discussed, ordered, or conducted. Document-dependent issues (service validity, notices, lease/licence status, lockout records, disposal records) were determined summarily without disclosure. This is a compelling reason under CPR 24.2(b) why the claims should not have been disposed of before proper disclosure case management. The record was incomplete and asymmetric.

In BL-2024-001089, R1 applied for a stay of proceedings, not a strike-out for abuse of process under CPR 3.4(2)(b). A stay presupposes the proceedings have life. If Kelly had determined everything, the proper course was strike-out. The defendant's choice of remedy is an implicit admission Kelly was interim. Master Kaye independently confirmed this at 6 February 2025.

Chelsea Harbour sold property belonging to Michael personally and Mastermind Group Ltd for GBP 1,100 to Barrington Marketing Limited. Mastermind Promotion Ltd held the lease but is dormant with zero property rights. No itemised list provided. Sale after cease and desist letter. Strict liability conversion: Kuwait Airways v Iraqi Airways [2002] 2 AC 883. Only quantum remains. Causes of action assigned to Michael in April 2024 (pre-liquidation). Steven Ross WS admits disposal.

The CPR 52.30 application seeks to reopen the PTA refusal against Kelly's interim injunction decision. It does not seek to relitigate the substantive Chancery claims. Kelly para 50: 'It remains open to the claimants to bring a substantive claim.' Kelly para 31: 'Not for the court today to make findings of fact.' Dove treated interim as final. CPR 52.5 does not bar CPR 52.30 (separate jurisdiction). R2/R3 were not even parties to the Kelly hearing.