Despite these defects, the Defence itself concedes liability on the core elements of the claim (see admissions below). R2/R3 were not parties to the Kelly interim injunction hearing (KB-2024-001508). The Recorder Cohen summary judgment (19 August 2025) is challenged as a derivative nullity.
See also the Contradictions page for full analysis of how this Defence contradicts the Defendants' own Skeleton Argument.
| Para | Status | Summary | Consequence |
|---|---|---|---|
| 4.1 | Acknowledged | Acknowledges PHA 1997 duty exists and applies to the Defendants' conduct. Does not dispute that the statute governs their behaviour. | Duty accepted |
| 10.1 + | Admitted | Agreement details admitted. The Defendants admit the existence and terms of the licence agreement between the Claimant and the Defendants. | Binding |
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Legal significance
The admission of the agreement's existence and terms is irrevocable under CPR 14.1(5). The Defendants cannot later deny the agreement existed or dispute its terms without court permission.
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| 10.2 | Denied | Denies the agreement conferred exclusive possession. Asserts it was a contractual licence only. | |
| 10.3 | Denied | Denies the fee increase was unlawful. Asserts the increase was within the terms of the agreement. | |
| 10.4 + | Admitted | Mid-month payment agreement admitted. The Defendants admit a mid-month payment arrangement existed between the parties. | Binding |
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Legal significance
The admission of a mid-month payment agreement undermines the Defendants' position on alleged arrears. If the Claimant was permitted to pay mid-month, no breach existed at the time of the lockouts.
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| 10.5.1 | Denied | Denies the lockouts were unlawful. Asserts the lockouts were permitted under the agreement. | |
| 10.5.2 + | Admission | Lockouts without prior notice. Admits that the lockouts (6 in total) were effected without prior notice to the Claimant. No contractual right to lock out without notice exists. | PHA 1997 element |
|
Legal significance
'It is admitted that this (and subsequent lockouts) were effected without prior notice.'No contractual right to lock out without notice exists. Even if clause 9.3 permitted lockouts, no clause permitted them without notice. This admission satisfies the 'course of conduct' element of PHA 1997, s.1(1): two or more occasions of harassment. Six lockouts without notice far exceeds the statutory threshold. |
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| 10.6 | Denied | Denies the Claimant suffered the losses claimed. General denial of quantum. | |
| 10.7.1 | Not admitted | Neither admits nor denies the alleged intimidation by security staff on 17 February 2023. | |
| 10.7.2 | Not admitted | Neither admits nor denies the alleged verbal altercation between the Claimant and security staff. | |
| 10.7.3 + | Admission | Claimant warned of police for harassment. Admits the Claimant warned the Defendants of police action for criminal harassment on 17 February 2023. | PHA 1997 knowledge |
|
Legal significance
This admission is devastating for the Defendants' position on harassment knowledge. After 17 February 2023, the Defendants knew, or ought to have known, that their conduct amounted to harassment. This satisfies the knowledge element of PHA 1997, s.1(1)(b). It also establishes a clear 'before and after' dividing line: any identical conduct after this date was carried out with actual knowledge of its harassing effect.
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| 10.8 + | Asserted | Termination notice by email. Asserts termination notice was given 20 February 2023, by email rather than post. | Procedural defect |
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Legal significance
The agreement required notice to be given by post. Serving termination by email is a procedural defect that may render the termination invalid. The Defendants' assertion that termination was effected by email, not post, may constitute an admission that proper notice was never given.
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| 10.9 | Denied | Denies the lockouts were retaliatory. Asserts they were standard commercial enforcement. | |
| 10.10 | General denial | General denial of remaining allegations in section 10. No specific admissions or denials of individual allegations. | |
| 10.11 + | Admission | Further lockouts after harassment warning. Admits 2 further lockouts on 27 April 2023 and 20 May 2023, occurring after the harassment warning of 17 February 2023. | PHA 1997 continuation |
|
Legal significance
This is perhaps the single most damaging admission in the entire Defence. The Defendants admit continuing the identical conduct (lockouts) on 27 April and 20 May 2023, more than two months after the Claimant warned them of police action for criminal harassment on 17 February 2023. This satisfies the final element of PHA 1997 harassment: continuation with actual knowledge. Combined with para 10.5.2 (6 lockouts without notice) and para 10.7.3 (harassment warning), the complete harassment test is satisfied from the Defence alone. Authority: Majrowski v Guy's and St Thomas' NHS Trust [2006] UKHL 34.
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| 12.1 + | Admitted | Label not decisive. Exclusive possession is key. Admits that whether an arrangement is a licence or a tenancy depends on substance, not labelling. | Tenancy argument open |
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Legal significance
This admission opens the door for the Claimant to argue that despite the agreement being labelled a 'licence', the substance of the arrangement conferred exclusive possession and therefore created a tenancy. Per Street v Mountford [1985] AC 809, if the occupier has exclusive possession for a term at a rent, the arrangement is a tenancy regardless of what the parties call it. The Defendants have admitted the legal test that could defeat their own position.
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| 17.1 + | Contradicted | Denied ADHD knowledge. Denies the Claimant ever informed the Defendants of his ADHD or sent medical documentation. Directly contradicted by the same team's Skeleton Argument at para 30(e). | False statement |
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The contradiction
'It is denied that the Claimant ever informed the Defendants that he has ADHD, sent them any medical documentation and/or that he ever requested any adjustments from them as a result.' Contradicted by Skeleton Argument para 30(e)
'insofar as the Claimant requires reasonable adjustments for his ADHD, these can be as easily provided in the CCCL as in the High Court.'
The Defendants cannot simultaneously deny knowledge of ADHD (Defence 17.1) and acknowledge he needs adjustments for it (Skeleton 30(e)). Both documents are signed under Statement of Truth by Zulfikar Virani, Director of Lower Richmond Properties Ltd and Vista (London) Ltd (R2/R3). One of these sworn statements is necessarily false. See the full contradiction analysis.
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| 17.4 + | Admitted | Adjustments were not made. Explicitly admits that reasonable adjustments were not made for the Claimant's disability. | EA 2010 s.20 breach |
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Legal significance
'It is admitted that adjustments were not made for him.'Explicit admission of EA 2010 s.20 breach under Statement of Truth. The duty to make reasonable adjustments is a strict liability duty. Once the duty arises and it is admitted that adjustments were not made, breach is established. The only remaining question is what adjustments would have been reasonable, not whether the duty was breached. |
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| 20.1 | General denial | General denial of the Claimant's loss and damage. No specific challenge to individual heads of loss. | |
| 20.2 | Not admitted | Neither admits nor denies the quantification of the Claimant's losses. Puts the Claimant to proof. | |
| 20.3 + | Admission | Causation admitted. Admits 'the lockouts and/or the fee increase could have caused some business disruption to Mastermind.' | Quantum only issue |
|
Legal significance
'It is admitted that the lockouts and/or the fee increase could have caused some business disruption to Mastermind.'Once causation is admitted under Statement of Truth, quantum is the only remaining issue. The Defence cannot retract this admission without court permission under CPR 14.1(5). No application to withdraw any admission has been made. This admission effectively concedes liability on the question of whether the Defendants' conduct caused harm. The only dispute remaining is the extent of that harm. |
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"On 10 May 2023 the Defendant granted Mastermind Promotion Ltd a commercial lease for the Premises for a 3-year term commencing on 9 June 2023. The Rent was £16,440 plus VAT per annum."
Confirms valid tenancy. Establishes the landlord-tenant relationship and lease terms that ground the relief from forfeiture claim.
"On 11 December 2023 the Defendant re-entered the Premises by changing the locks."
"They have accordingly been sold to the new occupant for £1,100. These funds are being held by the Defendant."
Admits conversion of the entire contents of a music business office (equipment, IP materials, business records, client databases) for £1,100 without independent valuation. Strict liability under Kuwait Airways Corp v Iraqi Airways Co [2002] UKHL 19. The true value of the IP alone exceeds £1M (Steinhuber investment evidence: £600K committed, £305K paid).
"On 1 May 2024 the Defendant re-let the Premises to Barrington Marketing Limited pursuant to a licence."
Admits re-letting during active lease dispute. Conduct inconsistent with forfeiture constitutes waiver: Segal Securities Ltd v Thoseby [1963] 1 QB 887. Chelsea Harbour cannot claim forfeiture while simultaneously profiting from the premises by re-letting to a third party.
"The Claimants could be adequately compensated in money should its claim ultimately be successful."
Chelsea's own solicitor concedes that damages are an adequate remedy. This admission supports the quantum claim (£11.82M DCF) and contradicts any argument that the case should be struck out or that damages would be unenforceable.
Two sworn documents. 9 admissions. 2 false statements. 2 contradictions. 2 signatories across both Defendants. Their own evidence defeats them.
R2/R3 (Virani): 4 admissions in LRP/Vista Defence. R1 (Ross): 5 admissions in Chelsea witness statement. All under Statement of Truth. All irrevocable under CPR 14.1(5).